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Abstract 
The per-unit end prices in the German mobile telecommunication sector are now at 
Norwegian level, after being about twice as high as the Norwegian per-unit end prices in 
2010. By analysing the mobile telecommunication sectors in the two countries, two probable 
causes of the end price differences the last five years are found. One is the demand side 
differences between the two countries, causing slower development towards higher revenue 
per user and lower per-unit end prices in Germany. The other is the static competition in the 
German market during the period of on-net/off-net price discrimination, caused by Deutsche 
Telekom and Vodafone’s joint market share and the possible tacit collusion between them. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Research motivation 
Reports like the OECD Communications Outlook consist of data on the telecommunications 
industry, where market characteristics, technology use, investments in infrastructure, 
regulatory trends, consumption trends and end prices in the OECD countries are presented. 
However, literature explaining the counter-intuitive end price differences between Norway 
and Germany has so far not been found by the author of this paper. 
The reason for the choice of the compared countries is cultural ties of  the author and 
first-hand economic experiences related to them. 
1.2 Research introduction 
Mobile telecommunication prices have been falling sharply in the OECD area after the 
privatisation processes started in most of the member states in the early 1990s (OECD, 
2011). Germany and Norway are two of the countries that have experienced these falling 
prices, but the Norwegian consumers have benefited from lower prices than the German 
consumers the previous decade (OECD, 2001-2011). However, the German per-unit end 
prices have dipped the last two years, being today at around Norwegian level. The paper will 
present the development of the industry in the two countries from 2008 until today, June 
2013. With the starting point of the thesis being the difference in end prices of the traditional 
mobile telecom services, voice call and SMS, these will be of main focus, but the mobile 
data service will also be considered. The paper considers both business subscriptions and 
personal subscriptions, although some of the data, e.g. the underlying traffic for the end price 
examples, match personal consumption better than business consumption. The paper is 
written with the intention of it being read also by readers with only little business and 
economy knowledge. 
1.3 Research question 
The Norwegian and the German mobile telecommunication sectors – what explains the 
higher German end prices the last five years? 
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2. Data and theory 
2.1 Data and theory part introduction 
The paper is a multiple-case study, exploring two cases, being the Norwegian and the 
German mobile telecommunication sectors, and presenting the differences relevant for the 
research question. The data used is secondary data from multiple, publically available 
sources. 
The data and theory part includes data on voice and data traffic, end prices, market shares, 
accounting data, frequency allocation and frequency cost, infrastructure cost, consumer 
behaviour, regulatory differences between the two countries, and theory connected to the 
regulation of the sector. 
2.2 Voice and data traffic 
2.2.1 Voice traffic 
There are distinct differences in the use of fixed and mobile telephony between Norway and 
Germany. In 2010, the fixed-line (originated) voice traffic in Norway amounted to 6.4 billion 
minutes, while the mobile (originated) voice traffic amounted to 12 billion minutes (NPT, 
2012c). The same year, the fixed-line (originated) voice traffic in Germany amounted to 195 
billion minutes, while the mobile (originated) voice traffic amounted to 102 billion minutes 
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2011). Converted to percentages, mobile voice traffic constituted 65 per 
cent of total traffic in Norway, while it constituted only 34 per cent of the German total 
traffic. The average mobile voice traffic share in the European Economic Area (EEA) was 
57 per cent in 2010 (GSMA & A.T. Kearney, 2011).  
In 2012, the share of voice traffic originated in the mobile network was 73 per cent in 
Norway and 38 per cent in Germany (NPT, 2013b) (Bundesnetzagentur, 2013a) (Bitkom, 
2013a). 
In figure 1 below voice traffic originated in the mobile networks in Norway and Germany is 
shown, per subscription.  
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Figure 1 
 
Sources: (Bundesnetzagentur, 2013a) (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012a) (NPT, 2013b) (Bitkom, 2012a) (Bitkom, 
2013a) 
The figure shows the significant difference in traffic per subscription between the countries, 
with the Norwegian traffic being about twofold the German traffic. Number of minutes 
originated per mobile subscription in 2012 was 2214 in Norway and 972 in Germany. 
The 2013 German market penetration rate, being the number of subscriptions per inhabitant, 
is 1.38, while the Norwegian rate is 1.14. This means that the mobile voice traffic 
differences between Germany and Norway are smaller per inhabitant than the per 
subscription differences shown in the figure above, with outgoing minutes per inhabitant in 
2012 being 2530 in Norway and 1340 in Germany. The market penetration rates are based 
on subscription numbers of 113 million for Germany and 5.8 million for Norway, and on 
population numbers of 82 million for Germany and 5.1 million for Norway (NPT, 2013b) 
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2013a) (Statistics Norway, 2013) (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013). 
 
2.2.2 Mobile data traffic 
While voice call revenue is decreasing in both Norway and Germany, and the level of voice 
traffic has matured, data traffic and data revenues are sharply increasing in both countries. 
Below is figure 2, showing the sharp increase from 2008 to 2012 in mobile data traffic per 
inhabitant in Norway and Germany. 
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Figure 2 
 
Sources: (Bundesnetzagentur, 2013a) (NPT, 2013b) (NPT, 2012c) (Bundesnetzagentur, 2011) 
The difference in the levels of data traffic between the two countries is even bigger than the 
difference in the levels of voice traffic. In 2010, the average German inhabitant transmitted 
0.8 gigabytes of data, while the average Norwegian transmitted 1.84 gigabytes. The 
difference increased from 2010 to 2012, with the ratio Norwegian to German data traffic 
level being 2.3 to one in 2010 and 2.75 to one in 2012. 
The data traffic numbers here, both for Norway and Germany, include both the traffic from 
ordinary mobile telecom plans and from dedicated subscriptions for mobile data. The share 
of data from ordinary mobile telecom plans is increasing, but still low, at 38 per cent in 
Norway in 2012 (NPT, 2013b). 
2.3 End prices 
The OECD Communications Outlook is published every 2 years. It provides an overview of 
the price levels in the different OECD countries. The OECD uses a method were they build 
standard baskets of consumption, and then compare the resulting prices for these baskets in 
the different OECD countries. The prices presented for each country are the prices of the 
least-cost plan in each country, given the demand profile of the different baskets (OECD, 
2011). 
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The average duration of the standard calls in the following tables is around 2 minutes and the 
calls are of all types (mobile-to-mobile, mobile-to-fixed, on-net, off-net, and voicemail) and 
calls made at different times of the day and the week. 
The numbers are in euros per basket per month. They include value-added taxes, which are 
25 per cent in Norway and 19 per cent in Germany (DBJ, 2013) (NTA, 2013). Without the 
value-added taxes, the Norwegian numbers would consequently be even lower, relatively. 
The numbers are not PPP (purchasing power parity) adjusted. OECD operates with PPP 
adjusted numbers as the rule, but I find the absolute numbers to be the more appropriate. 
Adjusting for PPP would also make the Norwegian numbers even lower, relatively. 
2008 
The OECD mobile baskets of 2008 were the low-use basket (30 calls, 33 SMS’ and one 
MMS per month), the medium-use basket (65 calls, 50 SMS’ and one MMS per month) and 
the high-use basket (140 calls, 55 SMS’ and one MMS per month). The resulting prices in 
euros per month are shown in the following table: 
Table 1 
2008 Low Medium High 
Germany 8 31 47 
Norway 9 17 31 
Sources: (OECD, 2009), numbers in euros per month, not PPP adjusted, 2008 EUR/USD 1.47 
2010 
The 2010 baskets were one low-use basket (30 calls and 100 SMS’ per month), two 
medium-use baskets (100 calls plus 140 SMS’ and 300 calls plus 225 SMS’ per month) and 
the high-use basket (900 calls and 350 SMS’ per month) (OECD, 2011). The resulting 
monthly bills in Germany and Norway were as presented in the following table: 
Table 2 
2010 Low Medium Medium High 
Germany 16 34 79 109 
Norway 6 17 41 58 
Sources: (OECD, 2011), numbers in euros per month, not PPP adjusted, 2010 EUR/USD 1.33 
The Norwegian end prices were far below the German in 2008 and 2010, and the difference 
was at its largest in 2010 with Norwegian prices around half of the German. 
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As mentioned in the previous section on mobile use, the 2009 average was 177 minutes per 
month per subscriber in Norway and 70 minutes per subscriber per month in Germany 
(OECD, 2011). This means that the average German subscriber received monthly bills 
around the OECD low-use basket and the average Norwegian subscriber bills around the 
lower medium-use basket size. This matter of operator revenue per subscriber is presented 
further in the section 2.4 on average revenue per user (ARPU). 
2013 
The last year, the German end prices have been falling significantly, while the Norwegian 
prices have flattened out. The cheapest German mobile telecom plans are now below the 
cheapest Norwegian plans. The cheapest plans, based on the two medium-use baskets and 
the high-use basket of 2010, are two-part tariffs plans and flat-rate plans (without on-net/off-
net price discrimination). The two-part tariff plans consist of a certain fixed monthly fee and 
a certain amount of included use, while the flat-rate plans consist of a certain fixed monthly 
fee and unlimited use (of voice calls and/or SMS’, not mobile data). The following tables 
show the prices in June 2013, retrieved from one German and one Norwegian mobile plan 
data base (Handytarife.de and Telepriser.no) with tariff calculators. The numbers in the 
following table are resulting from the two medium-use and the high-use baskets of the 
OECD 2011 baskets: 
Table 3 
2013 Medium Medium High 
Germany 15 20 20 
Norway 15 26 26 
Sources: (Telepriser.no, 2013) (Handytarife.de, 2013), numbers in euros per month, 2013 EUR/NOK 7.6 
The cheapest plans in the latter of the two medium-use baskets and in the high-use basket 
are, in both countries, standard two-part tariff or flat-rate plans, offered by most of the 
operators. The type of plan, two-part tariff or flat-rate, depends on which operator is offering 
the plans, as not all operators offer flat-rate plans at those prices. The German least-cost flat-
rate plans in the latter of the medium-use baskets and the high-use basket in the 2013 table 
are  plans offered by both Telefónica and E-Plus, while the Norwegian least-cost plans in 
these baskets are offered by different operators, including Telenor and TeliaSonera 
(Handytarife.de, 2013) (Telepriser.no, 2013) (E-Plus, 2013) (TeliaSonera, 2013). Both the 
German and the Norwegian providers have been offering these inclusive-plans (without on-
net/off-net price discrimination) for a number of years, introduced in Norway in 2005 and in 
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Germany in 2006, but they became more popular and cheaper in Norway earlier than in 
Germany (Bundeskartellamt, 2010) (OECD, 2007). As shown in the last table, today’s prices 
are identical in the two countries for the first of the medium-use baskets, and lower in 
Germany for the latter of the two baskets. Like the 2008 and 2010 numbers, the 2013 prices 
are including value-added taxes and are not PPP adjusted. 
Since the end prices in the table are based on the OECD baskets of 2010, data traffic is not 
affecting the prices in the table. In the cheapest Norwegian mobile plans offered on the basis 
of the latter of the medium-use and the high-use baskets, one GB of data transmission is 
included. In the cheapest German mobile plans in these baskets, only 500 MB are included. 
Upgrading the German plans to include the same volume of traffic as the Norwegian, one 
GB, costs 5 euros per month for the least-cost plans, meaning that the cheapest German 
plans cost 25 euros and the Norwegian 26 euros per month with similar included data traffic 
(E-Plus, 2013) (Handytarife.de, 2013). 
In German mobile inclusive-plans, with a certain amount of mobile data included, the 
standard is that when the limit is reached, the subscriber is not charged per MB excessive 
use, but experiences that the mobile data transmission is choked (down to GPRS speed) 
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2013a). 
2.4 ARPU (Average Revenue Per User) 
2.4.1 Mobile service revenues 
The mobile data revenues become more and more important for the operators. Revenues 
from mobile telecom excluding mobile data have been falling the last five years, but thanks 
to the increasing mobile data revenues, total mobile service revenues have been increasing 
slightly in both Norway and Germany (NPT, 2013b) (Bitkom, 2012b) (Bundesnetzagentur, 
2013a). When including dedicated subscriptions for mobile broadband, the mobile data 
revenues (non-SMS) constituted 19 per cent of total mobile service revenues in Norway in 
2012 (NPT, 2013b). 
In Germany, the mobile data revenues (non-SMS, but including dedicated mobile broadband 
subscriptions) constituted between 25 and 32 per cent of total mobile service revenues for 
the four mobile network operators in 2012, being higher than the Norwegian average for all 
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German MNOs (Vodafone Group Plc, 2013) (Telefónica Deutschland Holding AG, 2013) 
(Deutsche Telekom AG, 2013) (KPN, 2013). The sales revenues from voice traffic have 
been declining by about 5 per cent per year the last couple of years (Bitkom, 2012b). 
Share of fixed fees of mobile service revenues 
In Norway, where the development away from linear pricing plans has come further than in 
Germany, the share of revenues from the fixed fee related to the two-part tariff subscriptions 
increased much since 2010.  In 2012, 41 per cent of the revenues from ordinary mobile 
subscriptions were from the fixed fee and signing fee (NPT, 2013b). This is up from 21 per 
cent in 2010.  
2.4.2 ARPU 
The average revenue per user (per subscription, not per subscriber), the ARPU, is a popular 
measure within telecommunications. With total revenues flattened out in the mobile 
communication sectors in both Norway and Germany, and subscription numbers increasing 
by small figures since 2009 (falling in Germany since end of 2011), the ARPUs have been 
decreasing since 2009 in both Norway and Germany (Bundesnetzagentur, 2013a) (NPT, 
2013b). Since the average Norwegian mobile subscriber is using mobile services much more 
than the average German, the total ARPU per month and year has been higher in Norway 
than in Germany the last five years. The change to mobile telecom plans of fixed monthly 
fees and included use have led to much lower per-unit end prices, but only a  flattening out 
of the operators’ revenues and the connected ARPU, primarily due to increased data traffic 
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2013a) (NPT, 2013b). 
2012 – based on accounting data of the MNOs 
Based on the yearly financial reports for 2012, simply dividing the revenues from the mobile 
services by the number of subscriptions, give weighted averages (weighted by the market 
shares) of the ARPUs of 13.6 euros per month in Germany and 39.5 euros per month in 
Norway (Deutsche Telekom AG, 2013) (Vodafone Group Plc, 2013) (KPN, 2013) 
(Telefónica Deutschland Holding AG, 2013) (Telenor ASA, 2013) (TeliaSonera AB, 2013) 
(Tele2 AB, 2013). These numbers are adjusted for the differences in the market penetration 
rates between the two countries. For Norway, only the ARPUs for the three mobile network 
operators Telenor, TeliaSonera and Tele2 are included, and the Norwegian average ARPU 
would have been slightly lower if the mobile virtual network operators’ ARPUs were 
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included (assuming the mobile virtual network operators have lower ARPUs than the mobile 
network operators). A mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) is a mobile operator that 
buys capacity in the network from the mobile network operator (MNO), who owns the 
physical network. For Germany, the subscription numbers are including the MVNOs’ 
subscriptions in the networks, but the revenues are not including the MVNOs’ revenues, 
meaning that the German average ARPU should be somewhat higher. 
2012 – based on the annual reports of the NRAs 
The ARPUs reported in the annual reports of the national regulatory authorities (NRAs) for 
2012 are somewhat different from the ones calculated above, and are balancing the 
difference between Norway and Germany. The Norwegian Post and Telecommunications 
Authority (NPT) reported the monthly ARPU to be 30.4 euros in 2012 (NPT, 2013b). This is 
below the ARPU from the accounting data of the three MNOs. This is probably due to the 
exclusion of the independent MVNOs, but may also be due to the inclusion of fewer revenue 
accounts in the NPT calculation than in my calculation. I have included interconnection 
revenues in the ARPUs calculated from the MNOs’ accounting data, the reason being to 
adapt all numbers to the least detailed German company reports. 
Dividing the total revenues from mobile telecom stated in the 2012 annual report of the 
German NRAs, the Bundesnetzagentur (BNA), by total number of German subscriptions in 
2012 gives the higher ARPU that was demanded from the accounting figures. The German 
ARPU per month from this calculation is 19.2 euros ((€26 billion/113 million 
subscriptions)/12 months) (Bundesnetzagentur, 2013a). 
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Figure 3 
 
Sources: (Deutsche Telekom AG, 2013) (Vodafone Group Plc, 2013) (KPN, 2013) (Telefónica Deutschland 
Holding AG, 2013) (Telenor ASA, 2013) (TeliaSonera AB, 2013) (Tele2 AB, 2013) (DNB, 2013) (NPT, 
2013b) (Bundesnetzagentur, 2013a) 
2009 
The OECD reported in their Communications Outlook 2011 the 2009 monthly national 
ARPUs to be 29.2 euros in Norway and 16.7 euros in Germany (OECD, 2011) (DNB, 2009). 
Here there are also calculation differences from my calculation, in addition to a 14 % weaker 
Norwegian krone against the euro in 2009 than in 2012 (EUR/NOK 7.48 in 2012, 
EUR/NOK 8.74 in 2009), causing the lower Norwegian 2009 ARPU in the OECD report 
than the 2012 ARPUs from the financial reports of the operators and from the annual report 
of the NPT (DNB, 2013). Both the Norwegian and the German ARPUs were slightly higher 
in 2009 relative to 2012, however (Bundesnetzagentur, 2013a) (NPT, 2013b). 
2.5 Market concentration 
2.5.1 Market shares 
2012 
There are two mobile networks covering the whole of Norway, one network covering 70 per 
cent of the population, and 19 mobile virtual operators (NPT, 2012b). The two complete 
networks are owned by Telenor ASA and TeliaSonera Norway AS. The third network, being 
built by Tele2 Norway and covering 70 per cent of the country’s population in April 2013, is 
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to be expanded until it covers 75 per cent of the population, in accordance with Tele2’s 
contract with the NPT (DN, 2013b). 
Figure 4 – Market shares in the Norwegian end market 
Source: (NPT, 2013b) 
In 2012, Telenor had half the Norwegian market, 49.7 per cent, measured by the number of 
subscriptions. Second biggest operator is TeliaSonera, which includes both operators 
NetCom and Chess, with 24.4 per cent. Tele2 (including Network Norway) has 18.7 per 
cent. The remaining MVNOs have 7.1 per cent of the market, Ventelo being the biggest with 
2.3 per cent (NPT, 2013b). Numbers for the subsidiaries or different brands of the MNOs are 
hidden in the respective MNO’s numbers.  
In Germany there are four mobile networks covering the whole population, and about 168 
MVNOs (Bundesnetzagentur, 2013c) (Teltarif.de, 2013). The MNOs are Telekom 
Deutschland GmbH (Deutsche Telekom), Vodafone GmbH, Telefónica Germany GmbH und 
Co. OHG and E-Plus Gruppe GmbH & Co. KG (Bundesnetzagentur, 2013c). 
Figure 5 – Market shares in the German end market 
 
Source: (Bundesnetzagentur, 2013c) 
At the end of 2012, 16 per cent of the German subscriptions were connected to MVNOs 
independent from the four MNOs (Bundesnetzagentur, 2013a). When including this share of 
16 per cent independent MVNOs and spreading it across the four network operators, the 
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shares are like the ones in the figure above. This is not fully accurate, as more MVNOs are 
connected to the physical networks of Vodafone and Deutsche Telekom than the networks of 
E-Plus and Telefónica. Including the MVNOs, Deutsche Telekom had 27.2 per cent of the 
German market, Vodafone had 25.2 per cent, E-Plus, owned by the Dutch KPN, had 17.4 per 
cent and Telefónica, branded O2 in Germany, had 14.3 per cent (Bundesnetzagentur, 2013c). 
When excluding the MVNO subscribers, the market shares are 32.3 per cent (Deutsche 
Telekom), 30 per cent (Vodafone), 20.7 per cent (E-Plus) and 17.1 per cent (Telefónica) 
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2013c). 
2009 
In Norway in 2009, Telenor had 51 per cent, TeliaSonera 28 per cent, Tele2 8.7 per cent, 
Network Norway 7.4 per cent (Tele2 had not yet acquired Network Norway at the time) and 
other MVNOs 4.9 per cent of the subscription market in 2009 (NPT, 2009a) (Tele2 AB, 
2010).  
The independent MVNOs had a bigger share of the German subscription market in 2009 
than in 2012, at 22 per cent (Teltarif.de, 2011). When including the MVNOs’ share of 22 per 
cent, Deutsche Telekom had 28 per cent, Vodafone 26 per cent, E-Plus 13 per cent and 
Telefónica 11 per cent of all German subscriptions (Bundesnetzagentur, 2013c). If excluding 
the MVNOs, Deutsche Telekom had 36 per cent, Vodafone 33 per cent, E-Plus 17 per cent, 
and Telefónica 14 per cent of the subscription market (Bundesnetzagentur, 2013c). 
2.5.2 Market concentration 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a measure often used to measure the market 
concentration of a specific market (Haucap, Heimeshoff, & Stühmeier, 2010). The way it is 
calculated is by raising the market share of each player in the market to the second power 
and summing them up. This leads to a higher index number for markets where the biggest 
players have large market shares. The HHI is a convenient measure for exhibiting the 
relative sizes of the operators in the sector, as a complement to the study of each operator’s 
market share. 
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Figure 6 
 
Sources: the 2009 and 2012 annual reports of the Norwegian and the German MNOs 
2012 
Applying HHI calculation method to the 2012 numbers for Norway and Germany gives the 
HHI figures of 0.35 for Norway and 0.21 for Germany. The German number includes the 
market share of independent MVNOs of 16 per cent. The difference would be even clearer if 
the shares of the independent MVNOs in Norway and Germany were divided into each 
single MVNO before raising it to the second power, since the MVNO share of the German 
market is bigger than in Norway. However, these HHI figures display the more concentrated 
Norwegian market compared to the German, and is mainly caused by the 50 per cent share 
of Telenor in the Norwegian market. 
2009 
In 2009, both the German and the Norwegian market concentrations, measured by the HH 
Index, were slightly higher than today. 
The 2009 market shares give HHI figures of 0.35 for Norway (2009 figure of 0.355 vs. 2012 
figure of 0.347) and 0.22 for Germany. The German number includes the market share of 
independent MVNOs of 22 per cent. In 2009, Tele2 had still not acquired Network Norway, 
and that is why the market concentration was more or less the same at that time despite the 
higher market shares of Telenor and TeliaSonera (Network Norway, 2013). 
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
Norway Germany
Market concentration - HHI 
2009
2012
 18 
 
 
2.6 Consumer mobility 
A measure on consumer mobility is the churn rate. This is the average annual rate at which 
customers stop subscribing to their providers’ services, as formulated by the Oxford 
Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2013). This definition includes multiple provider 
changes done by the subscriber per annum, while other definitions count no more than one 
change per subscriber per annum (GSMA & A.T. Kearney, 2011).  
Based on survey information, the German average churn rate was 19 per cent in 2011, up 
from 18 per cent in 2010 (Statista GmbH, 2011). The Norwegian average churn rate was 20 
per cent in 2011, also based on survey information (NPT, 2011a). Both these numbers 
include a maximum of one change of provider per subscriber per year, meaning that multiple 
changes of one single subscriber are not counted. These churn rates were measured within 
the latest period of German end prices decreasing at higher speed than the Norwegian end 
prices. Churn rates for 2005 or 2006 would have been interesting, and would assumingly 
have been lower for the German market than for the Norwegian, but rates for those years 
have not been obtained. 
2.7 EBITDA margins 
The earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) is a popular 
measure on the operations performance, and especially in industries with high capital 
expenditures. Depreciation and amortization are not cash expenses, and the EBITDA is 
therefore a good measure on what has been generated from operations (Berk & DeMarzo, 
2011). The measure used in this section is the EBITDA margin, which is the EBITDA over 
total revenues. The OIBDA, operating income before depreciation and amortisation, used by 
Telefónica instead of the EBITDA, differs from the EBITDA in that it does not include 
sources of income and expenses connected to activities that are not part of the core 
operations of the company (Berk & DeMarzo, 2011). 
2012 
In Norway, Telenor Norway achieved an EBITDA margin of 42.4 per cent in 2012, up from 
39.6 per cent in 2011 (Telenor ASA, 2013). These numbers are for all telecom operations in 
Norway, including fixed-line telephony, internet and TV operations. 
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TeliaSonera Norway’s margin for mobile services was 31.8 per cent in 2012, down from 35 
per cent in 2011 (TeliaSonera AB, 2013).  
Tele2 Norway achieved a margin from their mobile services of 4.5 per cent in 2012, up from 
0.7 per cent in 2011 (Tele2 AB, 2013). 
In Germany, Deutsche Telekom achieved an EBITDA margin of 40.3 per cent in 2012, and a 
margin of 41.1 per cent in 2011 (Deutsche Telekom AG, 2013). These are numbers for all 
operations of Deutsche Telekom in Germany, including fixed telephony, fixed internet and 
TV services. 
Vodafone Germany’s margin was 34.8 per cent in 2012 (financial year until 31st of March 
2013), down from 36 per cent in 2011 (Vodafone Group Plc, 2013). These numbers also 
include fixed-line revenues and costs. The fixed-line revenues account for 23.5 per cent of 
total revenues. 
Telefónica Germany achieved an OIBDA margin of 24.5 per cent in 2012, up from a margin 
of 22.8 per cent in 2011 (Telefónica Deutschland Holding AG, 2013). These numbers are for 
all operations of Telefónica Germany, also including broadband and fixed-line operations, 
with the mobile services accounting for 74 per cent of the total revenues.  
KPN Germany’s EBITDA margin from their mobile services was 37.9 per cent in 2012, 
down from a margin of 41.8 per cent in 2011 (KPN, 2013). KPN is the Dutch owner of the 
brand E-Plus, which is the third largest MNO in Germany. E-Plus also operates the brands 
Base, Simyo, Vybemobile and Ay Yildiz. E-Plus only provides mobile services. 
2009 
In Norway, the 2009 EBITDA margin for the mobile services of Telenor Norway was 40.4 
per cent (Telenor ASA, 2010). The TeliaSonera Norway margin was 35.2 per cent for the 
mobile services (TeliaSonera, 2010). The 2009 margin for the mobile services of Tele2 
Norway was 6.9 per cent (Tele2 AB, 2010). At this point, Tele2 did not yet own Network 
Norway, and had a market share of 8.7 per cent. 
In Germany, the 2009 EBITDA margin for the mobile services of Deutsche Telekom was 
41.6 per cent (Deutsche Telekom AG, 2010). The margin of Vodafone Germany was 39 per 
cent (for all services and for the financial year ending March 31
st
 2010) (Vodafone Group 
Plc., 2010). Telefónica achieved an OIBDA margin of 24.4 per cent from their mobile 
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services (Telefónica Germany, 2010), and E-Plus an EBITDA margin of 41.9 per cent from 
mobile services (KPN, 2010). 
Figure 7 
 
Sources: the 2009 and 2012 annual reports of the Norwegian and the German MNOs 
The chart above shows the average national EBITDA margins, weighted by the market 
shares of the operators. It shows the higher average margins in Germany and the reduced 
margins in both Norway and Germany in the short period of three years. The 2009 and 2012 
margins in Norway were 0.36 and 0.32, respectively, while the German margins were 0.38 
and 0.36, respectively. The 2012 numbers are not as accurate for Germany as the 2009 
numbers, as there is only E-Plus of the four MNOs that have separate mobile services 
accounts in their 2012 financial report (as of June 2013). 
2.8 Infrastructure costs 
The telecom infrastructure investments per capita and per subscriber are higher in Norway 
than in Germany. Between year 2000 and 2009, the Norwegian telecom investment per 
access path varied between 1.4 and 5.5 times the German investment (OECD, 2003-2011). 
The 2005 figures with Norwegian investment being 5.5 times the German were an exception, 
with the rule being ratios between 1.4 and 2.4. In 2009 the mobile telecommunications 
investments per capita were 34 euros in Norway, while the German investments per capita 
were 24 euros. The total German investments in mobile telecom were 1994 million euros 
and the Norwegian 172 million euros (assuming mobile investment share of total investment 
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being the same in Norway as in Germany) (OECD, 2011) (2009 EUR/USD 1.39). These 
numbers are excluding frequency costs. 
2.9 Regulation of the mobile telecommunation markets 
2.9.1 Introduction 
To make sure that the network operators allow competitors to use their network capacity, the 
wholesale markets in Norway and Germany are regulated by the NRAs. The work is divided 
into three, being to define and limit the markets, to analyse and reveal possible significant 
market power, and to intervene in the right manner in cases where providers have significant 
market power (NPT, 2012i). The European Commission has defined seven markets of the 
telecom sector, with a recommendation on these markets being regulated specifically. These 
markets are to be analysed and reported from by the NRAs to the Commission. The 
Norwegian authorities report to ESA (the EFTA Surveillance Authority). ESA and the EFTA 
countries also orientate to the recommendations of the Commission (NPT, 2012f). The seven 
markets are (1) access to the fixed telephone network, (2) call origination on the fixed 
telephone network, (3) call termination on individual fixed telephone networks, (4) 
wholesale access to the local loop, (5) wholesale broadband access, (6) wholesale 
terminating segments of leased lines, and (7) voice call termination on individual mobile 
networks (European Commission, 2007a). These seven markets of the 2007 update of the 
directives of the Commission are down from a number of 18 in the 2003 edition of the 
directives. Market 15 of the 2003 directives was the “access and call origination on public 
mobile telephone networks” (European Commission, 2007a). Call origination is the service a 
network operator offers when it lets a customer start and establish voice connection to 
another network (NPT, 2010b). This market is still under thorough observation and 
regulation by the Norwegian regulatory authorities, due to Telenor’s exceptional position in 
the Norwegian market, but is not part of Commission’s markets recommended for such 
specific regulation, and is not regulated in Germany. The Commission recommends that this 
market should be handled by competition authorities ex post like most markets. The former 
market 15 will be explained in section 2.9.4 on call origination. 
A challenge for the NRAs is that not only do they have to make sure there are competitors 
entering and staying in the market, they also have to make sure that the network owners are 
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compensated enough to preserve and expand their infrastructure over time. This trade-off is 
often referred to as the static/dynamic trade-off (Valletti, 2003) (Charles River Associates, 
2012). What may be the optimal choice by the regulators in one static case, e.g. to set access 
price equal to the short-run marginal price ex post, is in turn hindering investors’ willingness 
to invest, as they will not be compensated fully.  
Call termination is the service a mobile network operator or a mobile virtual network 
operator offers when it lets a customer receive a call from another network. Normally, the 
provider charges the originating network operator, the network from which the call has its 
origin, a price for this service. With MVNOs in the market, interconnection may be 
established also within the same physical network, meaning that the call is originated in the 
MNOs network and terminated in the MVNOs virtual network, or vice versa 
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2011). The market for “voice call termination on individual mobile 
networks” is the telecommunication market 7 of the Commission (European Commission, 
2007a).  
The charging system in both fixed and mobile telephony in the EU and in the EFTA member 
states is based on the calling-party-pays principle. This means that the called network sets 
and charges the call termination rate and that the calling network pays what is charged 
(European Commission, 2009). This principle basically gives any operator significant market 
power in the call termination market. 
Due to the calling-party-pays principle, the market for call termination is regulated in all EU 
and EFTA countries. The core part of call termination regulation is the maximum price 
allowed to be charged for this service. These prices are today symmetric in both Norway and 
Germany, meaning that they are identical for all the network operators. The norm since year 
2000 has, however, been asymmetric prices (Bundesnetzagentur, 2007) (NPT, 2008). These 
asymmetric prices have been there to give entrants the incentives and the possibility to build 
infrastructure and to compete with the incumbent operator, or just to even out the market 
power in the market. Subsequently, as the markets have matured, the prices have converged, 
and are now identical for all operators in both Norway and Germany. These symmetric 
prices are newly fledged and came into action the 1
st
 of December 2012 in Germany and the 
1
st
 of January 2013 in Norway (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012b) (Norwegian Ministry of T&C, 
2012). 
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The presence of first mover advantages in mobile telecommunications gives the incumbent 
operator and the first entrant exceptional advantages over the rest of the entrants (Much & 
Heimeshoff, 2012) (Bijwaard, Janssen, & Maasland, 2008) (Foros & Steen, 2008). These 
first mover advantages mean that asymmetric regulatory treatment of the operators may be 
necessary to reach the goal of fair and effective competition in parts of the telecom sector. 
In Norway, Tele2 and Network Norway have earned much from the asymmetric construction 
of the termination rates the last years, an asymmetry constructed to give Tele2 and Network 
Norway the incentives and capital to build the third mobile network in Norway (NPT, 
2012b).  
The asymmetric termination prices in Germany up until 2010 were based on the relative 
market shares in number of subscriptions and sales, while the asymmetric prices in 2011 and 
2012 were based on an efficiency measure that did not take into account the sales figures and 
market shares (E-Plus/KPN, 2010). The efficiency measure is part of a cost allocation 
method of the German Federal Network Agency termed electronic cost documentation 
(EKN, from German), which again is part of their costing method KeL, which will be 
explained in the next section on the costing methods. 
The introduction of the new symmetric mobile call termination rates are in line with the 
Commission’s goal of reaching effective competition and subsequently to reduce or simplify 
the sector-specific regulation (European Commission, 2007a). 
2.9.2 Costing methods of the NRAs 
This section presents the costing methods used in the regulation of both the call origination 
and the call termination market. 
The choice of costing method depends on how the regulator assesses the costs to be included 
in the measure, whether the measure should be based on the actual costs incurred by the 
network owner or if it should be based on hypothetical costs incurred by an entrant investing 
in the infrastructure needed today, and how the infrastructure should be depreciated 
financially (Charles River Associates, 2012). 
The Commission published the new recommendations on the regulatory treatment of fixed 
and mobile call termination rates in the EEA in May 2009 (2009/396/EC) (European 
Commission, 2009). The purpose with the termination rate (TR) recommendation is to clear 
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the path for harmonisation of the call termination rates within the economic area, and to set a 
new common standard for costing within the area. Harmonisation of mobile call termination 
rates (MTRs) is also to take place nationally, meaning that the MTRs are to be symmetric 
within each member state. Valid exceptions from this symmetry requirement need to be 
based on objective cost differences that are outside the control of the operators concerned, 
like uneven frequency allocation due to out-dated licence allocation (European Commission, 
2009). The Commission does, however, recognise that market entrants have higher unit costs 
than the established operators until reaching a minimum efficient scale, and gives the 
national regulatory authorities (NRAs) the option of compensating such entrants temporarily 
(up to 4 years) (European Commission, 2009). The new method standard, the pure LRIC 
method, was to be implemented by the NRAs by the 1
st
 of January 2013, but the Norwegian 
NRAs are one year behind this schedule and the German NRAs are applying for the 
continuation of their own method (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012b) (Analysys Mason, 2013). 
The LRIC method 
The Norwegian NPT and the German BNA use the long-run incremental costs, LRIC, when 
regulating and supervising the telecom market 7 (mobile call termination), and in Norway 
also the former market 15 (mobile access and call origination) (Analysys Mason, 2013) 
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2012b). When using the LRIC method, the fixed long-term costs related 
to for instance infrastructure become variable and are included in the cost measure. The 
short-run marginal cost of producing one additional unit, e.g. one additional voice call, in a 
network with spare capacity is near zero, and basing the recovery costs on this would 
therefore not include the relevant costs for the network owner. Including operating expenses 
in a cost measure for mobile network operators is also not sufficient, as the capital expenses 
are the major expenses for the network operators. Even though both the NPT and the BNA 
use LRIC models for the determination of the maximum allowed termination charges, their 
models are unlike in which costs to include in the increment (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012b) 
(Analysys Mason, 2012) (Barth & Heimeshoff, 2012). 
The Norwegian LRIC version 
Until the end of 2010, the Norwegian call termination prices were set using different 
versions of LRAIC+++, long-run average incremental costs plus mark-ups, before today’s 
use of LRIC. The 2010 version of LRAIC+++ included network common costs, location 
updates and administrative costs and was based on the mark-up costs of the operator with the 
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highest costs (NPT, 2010c) (Analysys Mason, 2013). Since then, new versions of LRIC have 
led to inclusion of lower costs than before, as part of a gradual reduction down to a pure 
LRIC level in 2014. This gradual reduction of the rates is resulting from a gradual exclusion 
of common costs that are not traffic driven, and more emphasis on the costs of a hypothetical 
operator, instead of the traditional emphasis on the actual costs of Telenor and TeliaSonera 
(Analysys Mason, 2013). 
Pure LRIC 
There are different practices on which common costs to include in the cost measure, and 
through this, different versions of LRIC. The new standard for call termination in the EEA is 
the bottom-up pure LRIC model, from the TR recommendation of the Commission of 2009. 
The pure LRIC model does not include mark-ups for common costs. The reason given by the 
Commission for this is, among other reasons, that the call termination market is a two sided 
market, where both the originating part and the terminating part benefit from the call 
(European Commission, 2009) (NPT, 2010c). This challenges the logic of the calling-party-
pays principle, and suggests that the costs of the termination service should be split between 
the call originator and the call terminator. 
The pure LRIC model only considers the additional costs, also called avoidable costs, related 
to the call termination service, and the resulting measure is therefore relatively low when 
there is spare capacity in the networks (European Commission, 2009). To determine the pure 
LRIC costs, the bottom-up model is run two times, once with and once without the 
termination service being offered. The difference between the two resulting cost measures is 
the avoidable costs related to offering the termination service, i.e. the pure LRIC costs 
related to the service (European Commission, 2009) (NPT, 2010c). In other words, no output 
independent costs are included in the pure LRIC measure. 
The term bottom-up means that one identifies the costs of building a network, built by a 
hypothetical cost-efficient operator. The opposite approach, a top-down approach means that 
one uses actual costs faced by an operator that already has deployed its infrastructure 
(Charles River Associates, 2012). The most obvious advantages and disadvantages of the 
two approaches are the work saved by the regulators when using the top-down approach, but 
on the other hand the neutral outcome of a bottom-up approach. 
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The pure LRIC model is to be adopted by the Norwegian NPT in 2014, and the Norwegian 
version is currently under development (Analysys Mason, 2013). The Germans do not want 
to change to a pure LRIC model, as they find their current model to be better suited for the 
German market, and has applied to the Commission for the continued use of their LRIC 
version (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012b). 
The German LRIC version (FS-LRIC/KeL) 
The German model for the determination of the maximum allowed call termination rates 
considers the common costs related to all activities in the network, in addition to the direct 
costs related to the termination service. The German model is called full service LRIC (FS-
LRIC), or in German “Kosten der effizienten Leistungsbereitstellung” (KeL). In the German 
model there is a mark-up for output independent common costs, which includes a reasonable 
interest rate for capital employed and administrative costs (Barth & Heimeshoff, 2012). This 
mark-up will make sure that the compensation given through the termination rates covers the 
average costs of an efficient operator in a fictitious market with perfect competition. Since 
the continued use of KeL is not in line with the TR recommendation of the Commission, the 
German BNA has applied to the Commission for the continued use of the model 
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2012b). 
The new version of the KeL model, the resulting rates of which came into force the 1
st
 of 
December 2012, is a bottom-up model based on a reference network operator being an 
efficient operator facing current costs (as opposed to historic) with 25 per cent market share, 
being 28.5 million SIM cards, each with a specified demand based on the average demand 
per subscriber in today’s networks, and a specified number of frequency blocks in the 900-, 
1800-, and 2100 MHz bands (WIK-Consult, 2012b). 
As will be presented in section 2.9.3 on the call termination rates, the latest reduction of the 
MTRs in Germany is mainly a result of a higher data traffic share of total data and voice 
traffic, meaning that a smaller share of the common costs are to be covered by the call 
termination service (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012b). 
Pure LRIC vs. LRIC with mark-ups 
The difference between pure LRIC and full service LRIC in cases of low network capacity 
utilisation is shown graphically by the following (rough) figure: 
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Figure 8 
Source: (WIK-Consult, 2012a) 
Total network costs are primarily resulting from the need for geographic coverage, meaning 
that there will be a minimum of installed capacity independent of demand. Due to this, the 
pure LRIC measure will increase as traffic volume increases and capacity utilisation is 
increasing, due to the increasing marginal impact of the termination service on the network 
capacity. This is the opposite traffic-cost relationship to the one of LRIC measures with 
mark-ups for common costs. With mark-ups for common costs, the common costs are 
divided by traffic volume and the measure will thereby decrease as volume increases. In 
certain cases of stretched capacity, the pure LRIC measure may also exceed the FS-LRIC 
measure (Analysys Mason, 2010). 
Shown graphically, the termination cost measures resulting from the two different 
approaches, as traffic volume in the network increases, would look something like the 
following, with traffic ratio compared to today’s traffic volume on the x-axis, and the cost 
measure (e.g. eurocents) on the y-axis:  
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Figure 9 
 
Source: (Analysys Mason, 2010) 
Cost appraisal and asset depreciation 
When making use of the LRIC costing method, the NRAs have to decide on how to appraise 
the costs and how to depreciate the assets. The cost recovery may be based on either historic 
costs or on the current costs related to the investments. A historic cost approach means that 
one considers the actual investment costs as the costs that are to be recovered, meaning that 
they will not be reappraised, but recovered fully. A current cost approach, on the other hand, 
will normally lead to under-recovery for the investor, as the investment value is reappraised 
each period to reflect the costs related to deployment at date (Charles River Associates, 
2012). Under the new regulatory regime of the Commission, with the use of the pure LRIC 
method, the efficient costs are to be found based on the current cost approach (European 
Commission, 2009).  
The NRAs have different choices when it comes to depreciation method of the assets, which 
will affect the LRIC measure. The EC recommends economic depreciation to be used by the 
NRAs, wherever feasible (European Commission, 2009). 
The straight-line depreciation approach means that the asset is depreciated with the same 
amount each period, based on either the historic, actual investment value, or the calculated 
costs of a future or hypothetically built network. This straight-line depreciation leads to a 
front-loaded payment profile (sum of depreciation and return on capital employed declining 
each period), as opposed to the case of annuity depreciation, where the sum of depreciation 
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and return on capital employed is the same each year of the economic life time of the asset 
(Ofcom, 2013). Annuity depreciation is the method used by the BNA in the latest 
determination of call termination costs (WIK-Consult, 2012a). 
Economic depreciation, which is the recommended approach in the TR recommendation and 
used by the NPT, means that one tries to mimic a competitive market and depreciates the 
asset according to how much market value there is left in the asset, which means that the 
depreciation is the change in economic value during the period (Ofcom, 2013). Another way 
of putting it is that the economic depreciation follows the demand profile of the asset 
(Charles River Associates, 2012). 
2.9.3 Call termination rates 
Call termination rates and end prices 
The Commission is concerned that call termination rates above cost are used for cross-
subsidisation between operators, meaning that two or more operators (with significant 
market power) use the high termination prices as an excuse for higher end prices and 
weakened competition (European Commission, 2009). To address this concern over the 
medium term, termination rates should be cost oriented, paragraph seven of the TR 
recommendation goes (European Commission, 2009). 
The effect of a relatively high or a relatively low level of the termination rates on the end 
prices is, however, not clear with the two-part tariffs that are most common today 
(Andersson, Foros, & Hansen, 2012). Andersson, Foros and Hansen (2012) find that there is 
a positive, but insignificant correlation between a symmetric increase in mobile termination 
rates (MTRs) and the firms’ profits. The correlation depends on the structure of the contracts 
in the mobile telephony market. The work by Andersson et al. is based on data of 
subscriptions with fixed monthly payments with included use and no on-net/off-net price 
differences for the consumers. However, the authors also refer to work that find a significant 
correlation between a symmetric MTR increase and firms’ profits, but in that case, the work 
is based on linear pricing in the mobile plans (and no on-net/off-net consumer price 
differences), not inclusive-plans. Andersson et al. give one possible explanation to this 
correlation, being that the higher MTRs increase the marginal costs (but also increase 
marginal revenues) and thereby increase the end prices. This is also the reasoning the 
Commission adopted and expressed in the TR recommendation. 
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The two way traffic of the mobile networks makes sure that a change in the level of the 
MTRs does not affect the operators’ profits directly, as long as the MTRs are symmetric and 
the two way traffic is in balance. 
Before the symmetric termination rates (at low levels) of today, the operators in both 
Germany and Norway were trying to influence the NRAs to make them set higher MTRs 
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2007) (NPT, 2007a). Even though the asymmetry changed from time to 
time, the average level of the MTRs has decreased continuously in both Germany and 
Norway since 2006 (see tables 4 and 5). However, in the years before 2006/2007, with the 
former tariff standard of on-net/off-net price discrimination and two-part tariffs, what would 
benefit the operators as a group were MTRs below marginal cost, in accordance with Gans 
and King’s work (2001). The reason for this is that MTRs below marginal cost, with on-
net/off-net price discrimination and two-part tariffs, make the need for expanding the 
network size (in terms of subscribers) less urgent. The reduction of the on-net prices to 
attract the additional subscribers is in turn not as important, and competition weakens. With 
weakened competition and higher no-net prices, profits increase, operators are better off, and 
consumers worse off. The MTR levels in both Norway and Germany were far above today’s 
in 2006, and far above marginal cost, meaning that the MTR levels at the time were good for 
(strong) competition.  
Call termination rates, two way traffic imbalances/asymmetries and end 
prices 
The two way traffic between the fixed and the mobile networks and between the mobile 
network operators is not necessarily in balance, and changing MTR levels may affect the 
operators’ profits in cases of asymmetric traffic. 
Before the implementation of the 2009 TR recommendation, the average European 
termination rates for fixed-to-mobile calls were nine times higher than the termination rates 
for voice call traffic going the opposite way (Barth & Heimeshoff, 2012). The Commission 
wants there to be no more preferential MTRs for mobile network operators, at the expense of 
the fixed network operators. The TR recommendation bases the new termination rates for 
both the fixed and the mobile network operators on the same costing method (pure LRIC), 
and thereby evens out the historic difference in these, making sure that the fixed network 
operators do not subsidise the mobile network operators in this manner anymore (European 
Commission, 2009).  
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The two network operators with bigger market shares are net recipients of calls in Germany, 
meaning that there are more incoming calls from than outgoing calls to the two smaller 
network operators (Barth & Heimeshoff, 2012). The asymmetric ingoing-outgoing traffic 
between the two smaller and two bigger network operators is in the proportion of 2 to 1, with 
the bigger operators being the net recipients. By lowering the termination rates, in an isolated 
case of asymmetric traffic flows, the smaller network operators become more competitive, as 
the net flow of termination charges from the smaller to the bigger operators is reduced. 
The termination rate development the last years 
In the NPT’s 2007 resolution on market 7 (wholesale market for call termination in the 
mobile network) in Norway, the second resolution on this market, it is stated that the price 
cap regulated rates are to be de-escalated from the 2007 level to a cost oriented level (NPT, 
2007a). This means that the NPT has given the operators time to adapt to the new regulatory 
regime. The de-escalation is still in progress, as the following will display. 
The 2010 termination rates in Norway were at 0.0625 euros for Telenor and Teliasonera and 
0.1125 euros for Tele2 and Network Norway. Due to the gradual exclusion of mark-ups 
related to administrative costs, locational costs and network common costs in the LRIC 
model, the termination rates are much lower today than under the LRAIC+++ regime until 
the end of 2010 (Norwegian Ministry of T&C, 2011). From the 1
st
 of January 2013, the rates 
are symmetric at 0.02 euros for all three networks. 0.02 euros is Analysys Mason’s 
calculated reasonable MTR with today’s LRIC model, but the rates will go further down 
when the pure LRIC model is becoming the standard in 2014 (Analysys Mason, 2013).  
Table 4 - Norwegian maximum MTRs 
Norway 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Telenor €0.0850 €0.0813 €0.0732 €0.0690 €0.0625 €0.0385 €0.0267 €0.0203 
NetCom €0.1138 €0.1138 €0.0854 €0.0690 €0.0625 €0.0385 €0.0267 €0.0203 
Tele2  €0.1444 €0.1409 €0.1149 €0.1125 €0.0385 €0.0334 €0.0203 
Netw. Nor.   €0.1409 €0.1149 €0.1125 €0.1026 €0.0802 €0.0203 
Sources: (NPT, 2008) (NPT, 2010c), (Norwegian Ministry of T&C, 2011), (Norwegian Ministry of T&C, 
2012), EUR/NOK 8 for 2010, 7.8 in 2011, 7.48 in 2012 and 7.4 in 2013, based on exchange rates from DNB 
Markets. 
The 2010 termination rates in Germany ranged from 0.0659 to 0.0714 euros and went down 
to a range from 0.0336 to 0.0339 from December 2010 to December 2012 for the four 
MNOs. From December 2012 to December 2013 they are symmetric at 0.0185 euros, before 
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they go further down to a symmetric level of 0.0179 euros (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012b). The 
sharp fall from 2010 and on to today is due to a sharp increase in the data traffic in the 
mobile networks the last 5 years, and thereby the smaller share of costs to be allocated to the 
termination service based on the German KeL costing model (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012b). 
Table 5 - German maximum MTRs 
Germany 2006 2007 2008 2009-2010 2011-2012 2013 2014 
Telekom €0.1100 €0.0880 €0.0792 €0.0659 €0.0338 €0.0185 €0.0179 
Vodafone €0.1100 €0.0880 €0.0792 €0.0659 €0.0336 €0.0185 €0.0179 
E-Plus €0.1240 €0.0990 €0.0880 €0.0714 €0.0336 €0.0185 €0.0179 
o2 €0.1240 €0.0990 €0.0880 €0.0714 €0.0339 €0.0185 €0.0179 
Source: (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012b) (Bundesnetzagentur, 2007) 
Tele2 has received a total of 2 billion Norwegian kroner in subsidies from asymmetric call 
termination rates (subsidised by the other operators) in Norway. These subsidies were given 
to equip Tele2 with incentives to build a third Norwegian mobile network, and Tele2 is 
obligated to do so and to cover at least 75 per cent of the country’s population (NPT, 2012d). 
As of April 2013, the network of Tele2 covers 70 per cent of the Norwegian population (DN, 
2013b). 
Termination of SMS’ is not part of the seven telecom markets of the EC, but the EC 
acknowledges the need for ex ante regulation of other telecom markets if the NRAs find 
them not to pass the three-criteria test. Only three BEREC member countries (Body of 
European Regulators for Electronic Communications) are regulating their domestic markets 
for termination of SMS’ today, being France, Poland and Denmark (Danish Business 
Authority, 2013). 
2.9.4 Call origination 
In 2007, the EC updated their recommendations on telecom markets in which telecom-
specific regulation should take place (European Commission, 2007a). The former market 15 
of the Commission’s 2003 recommendations is the market for “access and call origination on 
public mobile telephone networks” (European Commission, 2007a). In Germany, the BNA 
has implemented the 2007 recommendations from the EC and is not regulating the market 15 
anymore (Bundesnetzagentur, 2013b). Earlier in 2007, before the new recommendations 
were announced, the BNA handed over a report of their analysis of the German market 15 to 
the EC (European Commission, 2007b). This report was part of the Commission’s 
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consultation with the NRAs prior to its new recommendations. In this report the BNA argued 
that there was effective supply competition between the four MNOs in this market, and the 
conclusion of the report is thereby in line with the subsequent recommendation of the 
Commission.  
In Norway, the NPT is still analysing this market specifically, as part of their core 
responsibilities. The reason for this is that the market still fulfils the three-criterion test of the 
NPT, which is a standard test among the EU and EFTA member countries. The three criteria 
are (1) that the market is characterised by high barriers to entry, (2) that the market does not 
tend toward effective competition without regulation and (3) that general competition law is 
insufficient for the relevant market (NPT, 2010a).  
The way the NPT regulates the call origination market is by demanding and examining that 
Telenor, the operator with significant market power in this market, is offering access 
according to a non-discriminatory policy and that they, in relation to this, keep separate 
accounts for the different activities for the NPT to look over (part of the transparency 
requirement) (NPT, 2010b). The non-discriminatory requirement means that enquiries from 
two or more external businesses are to be considered objectively, as well as considering 
internal vs. external businesses objectively. Telenor is to comply with all reasonable 
enquiries on national roaming, MVNO access and colocation of equipment. They are also to 
prepare standard offers on these markets. The former direct price regulation of access is no 
longer valid (NPT, 2012g). The prices charged for this are, however, to be at cost oriented 
levels. These levels are to be in accordance with Principle 3 of the NPT’s Document of 
Measures, and thereby cover common costs related to the infrastructure (NPT, 2009b). The 
separate accounts are to be reported each half-year, and there are to be separate accounts for 
voice, SMS and data traffic. The fixed network, mobile broadband telephony and 
international roaming are not covered by the separate accounts requirement. 
As part of the follow-up on the non-discriminatory requirement, the NPT carries out a 
margin squeeze test (NPT, 2012h). The operator with significant market power, Telenor, is 
to allow a so-called reasonably efficient operator to cover its costs and make a fair profit 
through its revenues when buying access to the network of Telenor. The term reasonably 
efficient operator is defined through LRIC costing. The LRIC costing is preferably based on 
fully distributed historic costs related to end user business, and on current costs related to the 
infrastructure. The alternative to using LRIC and the term reasonably efficient operator 
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would be to base the margin squeeze test on the cost measure called equally efficient 
operator, which means as efficient as the incumbent operator. Normally, in common 
competition law, the equally efficient operator measure is used, but the NPT and the 
Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications find the reasonably efficient operator 
and LRIC to provide a better basis when following up Telenor and the non-discriminatory 
principle (NPT, 2012h). 
Shown graphically, the marginal revenues, costs and profit margin of the access buyer: 
Figure 10 
Source: (NPT, 2012h) 
If the difference between the end revenues and the access price charged by Telenor is not big 
enough to cover the access buyer’s costs and a fair profit, a margin squeeze situation exists. 
If the MNO (Telenor) combines charging prices above cost in the wholesale market with 
reducing its end prices below cost, so-called cross subsidisation is taking place (NPT, 
2010b). 
2.9.5 EU roaming tariffs 
The international roaming charges in the EU and the EFTA countries are regulated by the 
Commission and have been reduced gradually each year since 2007. International roaming 
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tariffs are the prices charged by the national network operator for letting the subscriber use 
mobile telecom services in a foreign network (European Commission, 2013). The following 
table show the development in the EU roaming tariffs (regulated maximum) from 2009 to 
2014: 
Table 6 - Maximum international roaming tariffs in the EU 
Eurotariff max. 
roaming charge (per 
minute without VAT) 
Making a 
call 
Receiving a 
call 
Sending an 
SMS 
Receiving an 
SMS 
Mobile 
internet 
(per MB) 
Summer 2009 €0.43 €0.19 €0.11 free - 
Summer 2010 €0.39 €0.15 €0.11 free - 
Summer 2011 €0.35 €0.11 €0.11 free - 
Summer 2012 €0.29 €0.08 €0.09 free €0.70 
Summer 2013 €0.24 €0.07 €0.08 free €0.45 
Summer 2014 €0.19 €0.05 €0.06 free €0.20 
Source: (European Commission, 2013) 
The substantial decrease in all roaming charges reduces the operators’ revenues related to 
international roaming, revenues which have contained profit margins far beyond the national 
roaming revenues (Digi.no, 2007). 
2.9.6 Frequency auctions 
In both Germany and Norway the spectrum is regulated through auctioning of the most 
demanded frequencies, and a ceiling on how many blocks of frequencies each participant can 
acquire (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012c) (NPT, 2012a). Since these auctions are open for all 
interested parties, the prices of the blocks of frequencies will reflect the market’s valuation 
of the frequencies. Furthermore, since the German market is much bigger than the 
Norwegian, but more or less the same frequencies are used for mobile telecom, the prices for 
the frequencies are higher in Germany. The frequencies used in both countries are the 
intervals around 900 MHz, 1800 MHz, 2100 MHz and the 2600 MHz (Bundesnetzagentur, 
2010b) (NPT, 2013a).  
The current distribution of the mobile frequencies in Norway is presented in the following 
table: 
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Table 7 – Norwegian frequency distribution 
MHz 
Norway 
800 900 1700 1800 1900 2100 2500 2600 Total 
MHz 
Total 
blocks 
Share 
Telenor 15 15 20 20 20 50 40 40 220 44 47% 
TeliaSonera 15 15 20 20 20 20 20 20 150 30 32% 
Tele2 5 5 20 20 25 20 0 0 95 19 20% 
Total         465 93 100% 
Source: (NPT, 2013a) 
The Norwegian distribution of the frequencies more or less reflects the market shares of the 
three network operators. On the matter of a possible upcoming auction of the vacant 
frequencies in the 800 MHz band, the challenger Tele2 and the incumbent Telenor argue 
what is the right way of distributing these licences. As these are relatively low frequencies 
and thereby travel further than higher frequencies, Telenor argues that since the authorities 
want the whole of the population to be covered by mobile broadband, one operator should be 
given the majority of these licences for there to be profits to be made. Tele2, on the other 
hand, assesses such a procedure to be a way of materialising the historic duopoly of Telenor 
and TeliaSonera/NetCom (DN, 2013a). 
In Germany, the frequencies in the 800 MHz band were sold by auction in the auction 
rounds of early 2010, where most frequencies in the 0.8 GHz, 1.8 GHz, 2.0 GHz and 2.6 
GHz bands where sold. The three operators Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone and Telefónica 
bought 20 MHz each in this band, and have been investing heavily in infrastructure since the 
auction, since the frequencies are to be used for mobile broadband (Bundesnetzagentur, 
2012d). 
The distribution of the German frequencies is quite even among the operators and the 
smallest operator (market share-wise, with 17 per cent), Telefónica, possesses more than one 
fourth of the licences. 
Table 8 – German freqency distribution 
MHz 
Germany 
800 900 1700 1800 1900 2100 2500 2600 Total 
MHz 
Total 
blocks 
Share 
Telekom 20 25 20 20 15 10 25 20 155 31 25% 
Vodafone 20 25 5 5 20 15 45 20 155 31 25% 
E-plus 0 10 27.5 27.5 25 20 20 10 140 28 23% 
Telefónica 20 10 17.5 17.5 20 30 30 20 165 33 27% 
Total         615 123 100% 
Source: (Bundesnetzagentur, 2010b) 
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As mentioned, the limited number of frequencies available for mobile telecom makes the 
German prices higher than the Norwegian. The outcomes of comparable previous auction 
rounds in the two countries show that the price difference between the countries is larger 
than what the population and ARPU differences alone would suggest. When comparing the 
prices paid for licences in the 2 GHz band in Norway in 2012 and in Germany in 2010, one 
finds that the most expensive frequencies in this band were 77 times more expensive in 
Germany than in Norway, and the least expensive frequencies 50 times more expensive (see 
appendix figure 7.2) (Bundesnetzagentur, 2010d) (NPT, 2012e). In addition, the Norwegian 
licenses in the mentioned auction are valid 20 years, while the German are valid 15 years, 
which makes the relative licence prices per year in Germany even higher. 
Comparing frequency prices in less demanded bands give smaller price differences, 
however. The German 2010 auction licences in the 2.6 GHz band were less expensive than 
the ones in the 2 GHz band. Comparing them to prices for the licences in the 2.6 GHz band 
in Norway in 2007, gives quotients of 15 and 28 for the least and the most expensive 
frequencies, respectively (see appendix figure 7.2)  (NPT, 2007c) (Bundesnetzagentur, 
2010d).  
Frequency prices relative to national market value 
The German-Norwegian population quotient is 16, based on a German population of 82 
million and a Norwegian population of 5.1 million (Statistics Norway, 2013) (Statistisches 
Bundesamt, 2013). Due to the higher average ARPU in Norway than in Germany, the 
difference between the national mobile telecom market values of Germany and Norway is 
smaller than the population difference. Total mobile telecom revenue in Germany was 21.6 
billion euros in 2009, while the Norwegian was 1.9 billion (OECD, 2011). This gives a 
quotient between the national market values of 11.5. German frequency prices of 50 times 
the Norwegian mean that the German operators pay far more in frequency fees per 
subscriber and per euro earned than the Norwegian operators. 
Frequency cost relevance 
The result of the 2010 auction in Germany was total sales of 4.4 billion euros for 41 blocks 
of 5 MHz frequencies. Total number of 5 MHz blocks in the relevant bands for mobile 
telecom (the 800, 900, 1800, 2000 and 2600 MHz bands) is around 120, and using an 
average from the 2010 auction, the 120 blocks are worth around 214 million euros per 
German MNO per year (see appendix calculation 7.3). This corresponds to 28 per cent of the 
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depreciation and amortisation accounts of E-Plus in 2012, and six per cent of the total 
operating expenses, depreciation and amortisation  (KPN, 2013).  
2.9.7 National regulatory procedures 
Asymmetric termination prices in Germany and Norway 
The asymmetry of the German mobile termination rates that came into effect late 2010 and 
lasted until 2012 was abnormal in a European telecom regulation context. The abnormality 
was the fact that the rate set for Deutsche Telekom, the market leader in number of 
subscriptions (32 per cent market share) and in revenues, was higher than the one set for E-
Plus, the third largest operator with 19 per cent market share at the time of implementation. 
The BNA used their costing method, called electronic cost documentation (from the German 
“Elektronischer Kostennachweis”), where elements of the infrastructure are calculated 
bottom-up, but a top-down approach is used to set the different termination rates for the 
different operators, based on the voice and data traffic of the different MNOs 
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2010c). 
Decisive for the high rate for Deutsche Telekom and the lower one for E-Plus was the 
average voice traffic volume per subscriber, which was about twice as high for E-Plus as for 
Deutsche Telekom. The higher average traffic volume per subscriber leads to a higher, so-
called, minute efficiency, based on the German cost allocation method. This higher 
efficiency measure for E-Plus led to a lower MTR.  
The MTR difference between E-Plus and Deutsche Telekom was also influenced by the 
more developed networks of Deutsche Telekom for pure mobile data transmission. Deutsche 
Telekom’s dedicated networks for mobile data released capacity in the network for mobile 
telephony and thereby increased their cost measure relative to E-Plus, due to the relation of 
network capacity utilisation and the cost measure shown by the graphs in fFigure 9 (FS-
LRIC graph decreasing and pure LRIC graph increasing with increased network capacity 
utilisation) (E-Plus/KPN, 2010). 
The E-Plus group argued that they found it strange that the BNA suddenly dropped their 
argumentation for higher MTRs for E-Plus than for Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone from 
the previous round of MTR determination. In that round, the BNA pointed out two reasons 
for higher MTRs for E-Plus and Telefónica compared to the market leaders Vodafone and 
Deutsche Telekom.  
 39 
 
 
One was that the smaller operators E-Plus and Telefónica have a smaller shares of intra 
network voice calls compared to the bigger operators Vodafone and Deutsche Telekom (E-
Plus/KPN, 2010). This fact leads to higher termination charges paid by the two smaller 
operators than what the origination traffic implies. Continuance of this type of reasoning 
from the NRAs would be purely based on equalisation concerns. Instead of asymmetric 
rates, what is fair to the smaller operators is to avoid setting MTRs above actual cost, as this 
would lead to subsidies to the market leaders (from the smaller operators). 
The other reason was the disadvantage in frequency allocation for the smaller operators 
compared to the two bigger. As the licences are normally valid for 15 years, the growing E-
Plus and Telefónica have obtained fewer licences in previous auctions than would have been 
optimal. Such disadvantages are named as valid reasons for asymmetric termination rates in 
the EC Recommendation of 2009 (section 16), but only when resulting from non-marked-
based mechanisms (European Commission, 2009). This means that the auction rounds are 
dealing with the problem alone, not needing subsequent equalisation measures. The 
frequencies in the 900 MHz band are the most relevant on the disadvantage matter, as these 
lucrative, long-reaching frequencies were on the hands of Vodafone and Deutsche Telekom 
alone, up until 2006. In 2006, Telefónica and E-Plus got hold of 10 MHz each in this band, 
but are still outnumbered by Vodafone and Deutsche Telekom, with 25 MHz each 
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2010b). 
2007 German case on on-net/off-net price discrimination 
In July 2007, the Dutch owner of E-Plus, KPN, filed a complaint concerning alleged abuse 
of joint market power by Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone on the matter of on-net/off-net 
price discrimination. On-net/off-net price discrimination is the former normal procedure of 
charging different end prices for calls and SMS’s terminated within the network and in 
another operator’s network. In 2005, such tariffs were included in the subscriptions of 80 per 
cent of all German mobile users (Bundeskartellamt, 2010). The investigation by the German 
Competition Authorities subsequent to the complaint by KPN found that there was no 
substantial competition between Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone in the years around 2007, 
and that the competition in the market was driven by the smaller operators, that started 
offering two-part tariff plans without on-net/off-net price discrimination from 2006 and 
onward (Bundeskartellamt, 2010). 
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When considering the competition in the four physical networks, Deutsche Telekom and 
Vodafone both had and have a joint market share far above of what is defined as a dominant 
power in the German Act against Restraints of Competition (paragraph 19, sentence 3), 
which is a joint market share of two or three undertakings in excess of 50 per cent 
(Bundeskartellamt, 2002). Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone have about 62 per cent of the 
wholesale market and 52 per cent market of the end market, based on the number of 
subscriptions (see section 2.4 on market concentration). The market shares of Deutsche 
Telekom and Vodafone have been close to symmetrical the last 10 years, even though their 
joint market share has dropped (Bundesnetzagentur, 2013c). This fact, in addition to similar 
EBITDA margins and financial strength is also pointed out by the German Competition 
Authorities in their summing up of the investigation of Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone. 
Dominant providers are able to create a lock-in and a suction effect in the end user market 
when using differentiated on-net/off-net prices in combination with a two-year minimum 
subscription period, the Competition Authorities write (Bundeskartellamt, 2010). The 
suction effect arises from on-net/off-net price discrimination, as customers in smaller 
networks see the advantages of being part of a larger network with low on-net prices. 
Even though the German Competition Authorities list solid arguments for taking action 
against Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone, these proceedings were ended late 2009, before 
deciding if the market behaviour of the two dominant operators was abusive or not. The 
reason for this discontinuance was the development away from the on-net/off-net price 
discrimination (Bundeskartellamt, 2010). 
Regulatory treatment of Telenor 
As explained in section 2.9.4 on call origination, the Norwegian NPT is still giving the call 
origination and access market in Norway special regulatory attention. The NPT states that 
this market does not tend toward effective competition without special regulation, and 
Telenor is the only operator being labelled as an operator with significant market power in 
this market (NPT, 2010b). 
After the European Commission recommended the former market 15 on access and call 
origination to be taken out of the list of markets in need of sector-specific regulation in 2007, 
the Norwegian NPT had to come to a new decision on this market (European Commission, 
2007a). This decision was announced in August 2010, being that the Norwegian market 15 
would still be regulated, but without a specified access price as the ones that were set in the 
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period before 2010 (NPT, 2010b). However, through the non-discriminatory requirement, 
the wholesale price charged by Telenor is still regulated. 
Telenor filed a complaint against the decisions by the NPT of regulating the access and call 
origination market, both in 2006 and in 2010, as they did not, according to themselves, have 
significant market power in this market (NPT, 2010b) (Telenor, 2010). In 2010 they stated 
that since there was excess capacity in the network, there would be competition in the access 
market between NetCom (TeliaSonera) and Telenor without the NPT requirements (Telenor, 
2010). Only technicalities in the 2010 complaint regarding deadlines for accounting reports 
were obeyed by the NPT. As a result, Telenor has to follow the access and non-
discriminatory requirements of the NPT, and in addition offer transparency related to the 
operations. 
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3. Method 
The purpose of the research 
This paper is based on the observation of the end price differences in the two national mobile 
telecom markets, and the purpose is finding the probable reason(s) for these differences. The 
research thereby needs to be exploratory (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). The 
observed phenomenon as starting point for the research means that the research is inductive, 
trying to answer the research question (that is based on the observation), using collected 
secondary data and theory (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). 
Collected data and data analysis 
The objective of the data and theory part is to present the parts of the mobile telecom sector 
in the two countries that are affecting the end prices. Choosing the valid parts of the mobile 
telecom sector to investigate is easy, as the sector is clear and easily understood when seen 
from the top. The work of investigating each part more thoroughly is harder, and with regard 
to maintaining a high level of data validity, it is in some cases important to use multiple 
sources of data and to demonstrate that the findings may actually affect the end prices (Yin, 
2009). 
Data on the development of the end prices and the underlying characteristics of the sectors 
over time are necessary for concluding on the parts of the sector causing the end price 
differences. In this paper, the data collected to analyse are both quantitative and qualitative 
secondary data.  
Even though quantitative data is better suited for time-series presentations (in chart form) 
than qualitative data, the possibility of following qualitative development, of for instance 
regulatory treatment of former market 15, gives the case study strategy strength (Yin, 2009). 
To display the development of the end price differences in the period, data from different 
points in time in the period have been collected. For the voice and data traffic and end prices, 
data have been collected for the years 2008, 2010 and 2012/2013. For the ARPUs, market 
shares and EBITDA margins, data from 2009 and 2012 have been collected. For the call 
termination rates, the development from 2006 until 2013/2014 is displayed. The reason for 
the collection of data from three points in time for the mobile traffic and end prices is the 
rapid development in these numbers in the period. The ARPUs follow naturally from the 
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traffic and end price data. The weighted average EBITDAs and the market shares do not 
vary as much from year to year as the per-unit end prices resulting from each year’s least-
cost plans. Data from only two years for the three measures are therefore displayed. Call 
termination rates from as far back as 2006 are presented, since the termination rates during 
the last years of the on-net/off-net price discrimination are of interest. 
The operators in both Norway and Germany are studying the competitors’ prices when 
setting their own, resulting in standard offers offered by several operators, at the same fixed 
fee and the same amount of included use per month. The per-unit end prices resulting from 
the inclusive-plans are dependent on the utilisation of the included voice and data traffic 
volumes. The resulting least-cost plans in the latter of the medium-use baskets and the high 
use basket for the 2013 end markets are the same standard offers, and the resulting per-unit 
end prices based on the use in the high-use basket are thereby naturally lower than the 
resulting per-unit end prices in the medium-use basket. This means that multiple baskets are 
needed to give a fair comparison of the price levels between two countries, as the standard 
offers in one country may fit one OECD basket better than the standard offers in another 
country. 
The relative sizes of the parts of the thesis 
The data and theory part in the paper is relatively large. Finding the relevant and right data 
and theory is the most important part of an exploratory work like this. As all the data and 
theory used is secondary, the job of analysing it is a job of extracting the decisive and the 
right data. The analysis will follow as naturally as possible from the data and theory part, 
making sure that the work is as reliable as possible, meaning that repeating work on the topic 
would conclude with similar findings (Yin, 2009). This makes the data and theory part 
relatively extensive. 
The regulation of the MTRs has been given more space than its (absence of) effect on the 
end prices would suggest. The reason for this is the emphasis given by the operators and the 
NRAs to this part of the regulation. 
Assessment of case study as a research strategy 
Robert K. Yin describes the case study as an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2009, p. 18). The clear 
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advantage of the case study strategy, based on the research question in this paper, is the 
possibility to explore the cases of the Norwegian and the German mobile telecom sectors in 
the search for the cause(s) of the observed end price differences. Exploratory case studies 
have been criticised for being less scientific than other research strategies, but the research 
question in this paper calls for such a strategy (Yin, 2009). 
Assessment of the collection of secondary data and the qualitative data 
analysis 
A shortcoming of the collection of secondary data and the subsequent qualitative data 
analysis is the strong influence of the researcher’s biases. The researcher will be biased in 
both stages, and the work will bear the stamp of the researcher. Colin Robson (2002) 
introduces the observer bias and the observer error as threats to the reliability of the work. 
These are, as the terms imply, biases that I may have in my selection of data and possible 
errors in my data collection or in my data interpretation (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 
2009). The reliability of the work refers to how reliable the data collection techniques and 
the analysis procedures of the researcher are (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). The 
degree of reliability is high if one is sure that another researcher would reach similar findings 
when repeating the work on another occasion, based on the same research question. 
I have tried ruling out the observer bias by looking at all the parts of the mobile telecom 
sector without prejudice. As the starting point for the paper was an actual wonder about the 
reasons for the difference in end prices, the prejudice has not been strong, and the data found 
in the research has surprised me. As all the data and theory used in the paper has been 
secondary, I have tried ruling out the observer error threat by using multiple sources of data 
on parts of the industry where multiple sources have been accessible. 
The external validity 
The generalizability, named external validity by Yin, is the extent to which the findings in 
the research are generalizable to other settings, in this case to the comparison of mobile 
telecom sectors of other countries (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009) (Yin, 2009). As 
presented in the analysis part, the differences between the countries in the different parts of 
the sector affect the competitive environment and the end prices in both directions. All the 
different characteristics of the sector make the comparison of Norway and Germany unique 
and not generalizable, since the relative influential force of the different components of the 
sector will be different when comparing other countries. The purpose of the research is not to 
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be able to generalise from the findings, but to find the reasons for the end price differences in 
this specific case. 
However, the differences found can be generalised each by each, meaning that there will be 
no doubt that the difference in each single part of the sector will affect the competitive 
environment and the end prices in one direction only, if any. Statistical testing of the 
findings, based on data from all OECD countries, would be a natural follow-up on this 
research, though more challenging in terms of data collection. 
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4. Analysis 
The starting point of the thesis is the lower Norwegian end prices the last five years. This 
defies differences in the relative cost levels, topography, population size, population density, 
number of operators and market concentration, which all suggest a more competitive 
environment in Germany than in Norway. The analysis is an assessment of the components 
of the sectors in the two countries, allocating them to speak either in favour of or in 
disfavour of the observed end price differences. The components that are probable causes of 
the observed end price differences will subsequently be part of the conclusion. 
4.1 Traffic 
The Norwegians have adapted to a wireless world faster than the Germans, and the lower 
prices and higher volumes of traffic per Norwegian subscriber than per German subscriber 
the last five years are interconnected facts. The trend of substantially higher volumes of 
traffic per Norwegian mobile subscriber than per German mobile subscriber started already 
in 2000 (see appendix figure 7.1), and the consumption levels seem to be part of the culture, 
taking into account the higher ARPU in Norway. The flattening out of both Norwegian and 
German yearly voice traffic volumes, with the German level far below the Norwegian, 
support a statement of cultural differences playing a role, as the German end prices have 
fallen much since 2010 without voice traffic volume increasing much. Part of the differences 
in consumption levels between Norway and Germany is also the continued use of fixed 
telephony being higher in Germany than in Norway. The growth in mobile data traffic 
volumes is strong in both Norway and Germany, but has been stronger in Norway than in 
Germany since 2010. The higher volumes of voice and data traffic per subscriber in Norway 
support the observed per-unit end price differences the last five years, as the mobile telecom 
industry is an industry of high fixed and low marginal costs. 
The market maturities and the differences in consumption levels will be discussed further. 
4.2 End prices 
From the peak in the end price difference between Germany and Norway in 2010, the prices 
are now at about the same level in the two countries (when including the same amount of 
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data). The recent German price development has been rapid, as the 2010 German prices were 
about twice the Norwegian end prices. The resulting end prices from the two medium-use 
and the high-use OECD baskets show that the German prices have been cut in half for the 
medium-low OECD use basket, cut by two thirds for the medium-high OECD use basket, 
and by four fifths for the high-use basket from 2010 until today. 
Tariff models 
In 2005 on-net/off-net price discrimination was included in the mobile plans of 80 per cent 
of all German mobile users (Bundeskartellamt, 2010). At last, the smaller operators in 
Germany started to offer two-part tariff plans with included use and without on-net/off-net 
price discrimination in 2006, as Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone benefited from the on-
net/off-net price discrimination. These two-part tariff plans have been a success, and are 
today the norm in both Germany and Norway. However, the development toward the two-
part tariffs being the norm has gone slower in Germany than in Norway. When the smaller 
German operators introduced the new tariff plans in 2006, there were already “price wars” 
between smaller MVNOs in the Norwegian market, and the consumers were getting used to 
the mobile telecom market being the buyer’s market (Nettavisen, 2006). Since then the 
market for two-part tariff plans in Norway has normalised, and the two-part tariff plans have 
included continuously more use up until today’s situation with TeliaSonera (starting May 
2013) offering flat-rate voice calls (limited to 12 hours of call traffic per 24 hours), SMS’ 
and MMS’ in all their post-paid plans (Digi.no, 2013). The amount of included data traffic 
per month is now what separates the plans, and the rest of the operators will probably follow 
TeliaSonera on this standard shortly. In Germany, Telefónica and E-Plus also offer flat-rate 
voice calls, SMS’ and MMS’ in all their post-paid plans, but the data volumes included in 
their plans are lower (about half) than in the plans of TeliaSonera in Norway (for equal fixed 
fees) (Telefónica, 2013). 
Head of NPT, Torstein Olsen, believes that the trend with flat-rate plans will continue and 
that the system with call units is out of date (Amobil, 2012). The competition from VoIP 
(Voice over IP) operators increases the need for such a development, says CEO of Telenor, 
Jon Fredrik Baksaas (Amobil, 2012). Deutsche Telekom Chairman René Obermann states a 
corresponding German situation in the 2012 annual report, saying that they feel the effects of 
free online voice and text messaging services (Deutsche Telekom AG, 2013). The VoIP and 
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online messaging services are now substitutions for mobile phone calls and SMS’ that were 
previously not too challenging for the mobile operators. 
4.3 ARPU 
The Norwegian ARPU has been much higher than the German the last five years, even 
though the Norwegian per-unit end prices have been lower. This is due to the (substantially) 
higher level of consumption per subscriber in Norway than in Germany. These different 
consumption levels may be due to cultural differences (either private or business related), but 
also partly to the greater purchasing power of the Norwegians. Today, the increase in voice 
traffic volumes is flattening out, and with falling per-unit end prices, the revenues from the 
traditional mobile services of voice call and SMS are decreasing. The ARPU has maintained 
its level, however, due to the increase in mobile data traffic volumes. 
The Norwegian consumption of mobile services per subscriber has been far greater than the 
German consumption ever since the year 2000, and this may be the reason for the two-part 
tariff inclusive-plans becoming popular among operators as well as among consumers in 
Norway earlier than in Germany. As the marginal cost for the operators of providing one 
more unit of mobile services, e.g. one minute of voice call, is low, the ARPU is more 
important for the operator than the per-unit end prices. Two-part tariff and flat-rate plans 
also encourage the consumer to call even more or to transmit even more data, and the 
operator may thereby succeed in tempting the consumer into relatively high fixed fees, 
thereby securing a high ARPU level. 
Today’s difference in the ARPUs and the similar levels of per-unit end prices in the two 
countries suggest that the German market has the potential of both lower per-unit end prices 
and higher ARPU. The challenge for the German operators is to change the German 
consumer behaviour related to the use of mobile services, making them use more. 
4.4 Market concentration and consumer mobility 
The differences in market concentration support stronger German than Norwegian 
competition. Four German MNOs compared to barely three in Norway, and the more evenly 
matched German MNOs than the Norwegian, contradicts the higher end prices and EBITDA 
margins in the German market the last years.  
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The German competition in the German market has strengthened much the last three years, 
however. With the stronger competition, the big operators are striving to hold on to their 
positions as market leaders, stated by Deutsche Telekom in their latest annual report. 
Chairman Obermann states that they feel the effects of the price pressures in the mobile 
subscriptions. Their cost-cutting measures do not fully compensate for the higher 
expenditures for improving or keeping their market position, he continues (Deutsche 
Telekom AG, 2013). 
The data on consumer mobility show similar rates of mobility in the two national markets in 
2011, 19 and 20 per cent for Germany and Norway, respectively. 2011 was within the latest 
period of German end prices catching up on the Norwegian end prices, and similar churn 
rates at the time are thereby natural. Churn rates for 2005 or 2006 would have been 
interesting on this matter, but have not been obtained. 
4.5 EBITDA margins 
The lower Norwegian price level combined with the higher use level leads to a larger 
consumer surplus in the mobile telecom market in Norway compared to Germany. The 
higher average EBITDA margins in Germany show that the higher end prices in Germany 
are not due to higher operating expenses (alone). These EBITDA margins fell in both 
countries in the period from 2009 to 2012, but even more in Norway than in Germany. 
However, most operators have not reported the mobile specific EBITDAs for 2012, and the 
2012 numbers are therefore not fully comparable and applicable. 
The higher German EBITDA margins compared to the Norwegian the last years suggest that 
the German market has room for stronger competition. With strengthened competition, the 
focus on improved efficiency also becomes stronger, and this will probably enlarge the room 
for reduced end prices in relation to the Norwegian end prices further. 
As the EBITDA margin of Telenor Norway has been relatively high (around 40 per cent) 
through the period, the lower average EBITDA margin in the Norwegian market is due to the 
lower EBITDA margins of the smaller operators. Tele2 has had EBITDA margins below 10 
per cent during the whole period, and this illustrates the clear division of market power and 
competitive strength in the Norwegian market. 
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4.6 Frequency costs and infrastructure costs 
Frequency costs 
The German mobile telecom frequencies are more expensive (per subscriber) than the 
Norwegian frequencies. There are more or less as many MHz allocated to mobile telecom in 
the two countries, but the German market is much bigger and there are four MNOs in 
Germany and only three in Norway. The higher EBITDA margins in the German mobile 
telecom sector the last five years make the frequencies more lucrative for the operators and 
may also be a reason for the expensive German frequencies. 
The higher frequency costs per subscriber increase the German marginal costs relative to the 
Norwegian marginal costs. The frequency cost difference between the two countries thereby 
supports the observed end price differences the last years. However, constituting only six per 
cent of the total operating expenses, depreciation and amortisation of E-Plus in 2012, the 
frequency cost relevance for the end price differences between Norway and Germany is 
limited. 
Infrastructure costs 
Contrary to the situation in the frequency market, the German operators have cost 
advantages over the Norwegian operators in infrastructure deployment.  The probable reason 
for this is that Germany is densely populated and relatively flat, as opposed to Norway. 
Between year 2000 and 2009, the Norwegian telecom investment per access path varied 
between 1.4 and 5.5 times the German investment (OECD, 2003-2011). In 2009 the mobile 
telecommunications investments per capita were 34 euros in Norway, while the German 
investments per capita were 24 euros. The total German investments in mobile telecom were 
1994 million euros and the Norwegian 172 million euros (assuming mobile investment share 
of total investment being the same in Norway as in Germany). 
In Germany, the infrastructure costs per operator per year are twice as high as the frequency 
costs per year (499 million euros per operator versus 214 million euros per operator). This 
means that the German operators have a cost advantage over the Norwegian operators when 
considering the frequency and infrastructure costs together. 
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4.7 Call termination rates 
The expediency of MTRs as tool for equalisation regarding unrelated costs or differences in 
market power is debatable, and the new, symmetric MTRs in both Norway and Germany of 
today are therefore appropriate, as they aim to compensate for the termination service alone. 
The Commission states, in its recommendation on termination rates, that any deviation from 
the symmetric MTRs can only be justified by objective cost differences that are outside the 
control of the operators concerned, or higher costs for entrants below minimum efficient 
scale (European Commission, 2009, p. 71). This means that the former asymmetric rates in 
Norway, subsidising the entering operator Tele2, were in line with the new recommendation 
of the EC, while the asymmetric rates in Germany in 2011 and 2012, partly based on 
technicalities regarding the network technologies of the operators, were conflicting with the 
recommendation. 
Even though German call termination prices and end prices for mobile services have 
decreased at high speed and seemingly in correlation since 2010, and though most operators 
have been supporting continued high levels of the call termination rates, the first does not 
lead to the other. Andersson, Foros and Hansen (2012) show that when the subscriptions are 
of the two-part tariff (with included use, without on-net/off-net price discrimination) 
structure, the level of the termination prices does not affect the operators’ profits or the end 
prices significantly. 
However, the new line of the EC and the NRAs, with the regulatory downward pressure on 
the MTRs and the introduction of symmetric MTRs may have led to a new mentality among 
the operators, with less focus on the MTRs. With symmetric MTRs and a clear MTR future, 
the former uncertainty about future asymmetric prices has been removed. Without this 
uncertainty, the operators’ willingness to strengthen competition may have been influenced. 
4.8 EU roaming tariffs 
The continuously decreasing regulated (maximum) international roaming tariffs in the EU 
and EFTA countries reduce the operators’ super profits related to the international roaming 
services. The effect of these reduced tariffs on national end price level is ambiguous. Such 
over-charging in one market could be used for cross subsidisation, giving the operator the 
economic leeway of reducing its margin in another market, e.g. the national mobile telecom 
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market. However, effects of the high international roaming tariffs on national end price level 
the last five years are not known. 
4.9 Regulatory procedures 
Lighter regulatory treatment of the market leaders in Germany, and a clearer tendency in 
Norway to act in favour of the smaller and in disfavour of the bigger operators may have set 
the competition wheels in motion at an earlier time in Norway than in Germany. The 
relatively strict regulation of the Norwegian markets has given the smaller operators in 
Norway better and predictable terms, and thereby made the threat from smaller MVNOs 
present at all time. Weak competition in the German market and possible tacit collusion 
between Vodafone and Deutsche Telekom have until recently characterised the German 
market. The weak competition has now been replaced by substantial reductions in per-unit 
end prices, through relatively cheap two-part tariff inclusive-plans offered by all major 
operators. 
Call origination regulation 
The EC’s recommendation on which telecom markets to regulate specifically is a guide-line 
for the NRAs, but the exclusion of former market 15 in the newer recommendations does not 
mean that the market is effectively competitive in each EU and EFTA member state. ESA 
agreed to NPT’s assessment and their argumentation for the continued need for ex ante 
regulation of the Norwegian market 15, based on NPT’s application of the three-criteria test 
in the Norwegian market 15 (ESA, 2010). ESA and the NPT share the apprehension of the 
problems with Telenor’s significant market power in the Norwegian market 15, in the same 
way the EC and the BNA share the apprehension of the German market 15 being effectively 
competitive (European Commission, 2007a) (European Commission, 2007b). 
Telenor has to transmit all contracts made in this market to the NPT, in addition to reports 
twice a year stating the end prices and access prices charged by Telenor. Still, and in 
addition to this, Telenor is scrutinised from time to time when complaints are made. Such a 
complaint has recently (April 2013) been sent to the Norwegian Competition Authority and 
the NPT, where Tele2 is stating that the prices charged by Telenor for network access are too 
high and that the profit margin of Tele2 is being squeezed (DN, 2013c). Telenor is thereby 
checked even more thoroughly by the Norwegian authorities. 
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Assuming the thorough supervision of Telenor keeps the company from discriminating in 
the wholesale market, entrants or competitors will buy capacity in their network as soon as 
the end price is right. The supervision secures a fair wholesale market in Norway which 
cannot as easily be taken for granted in the German former market 15. 
The asymmetric MTRs of 2011 and 2012 in Germany 
Considering the line of the Norwegian NPT the years before today’s symmetric prices, with 
symmetric MTRs for the two bigger operators, and considerably higher MTRs for Tele2, the 
asymmetric MTRs of 2011 and 2012 in Germany were conflicting with the Norwegian 
regime. Mostly due to E-Plus’ higher volumes of traffic per subscriber and the higher so-
called minute efficiency connected with this, their MTR was based on lower costs than the 
costs of Deutsche Telekom, and thereby set lower than the MTR of the market leader. 
Even though the German asymmetric prices of 2011 and 2012 were resulting from a neutral 
cost allocation method rather than from a favourable treatment of Deutsche Telekom from 
the NRAs’ side, the rates conflict with both the German BNA and Norwegian NPT’s 
tradition of using MTRs as means for equalisation of market power. Asymmetric termination 
rates with lower rates for a smaller than a bigger MNO, have not been set by the NPT in 
Norway since 2006.  
However, considering the sharp decrease in German end prices after 2010, it seems like the 
higher revenues from MTRs of Deutsche Telekom than of E-Plus have not eased the 
competition in end prices. However, as mentioned, high revenues from the operations in one 
market can be used to compensate for lower revenues in another, and the higher MTRs of 
Deutsche Telekom in 2011 and 2012 thereby increased their competitive strength in the end 
market slightly, relative to E-Plus. 
Possible market power abuse by Vodafone and Deutsche Telekom 
Due to the specific supervision and regulation of Telenor, it is harder for Telenor than for the 
major German operators to exploit opportunities of earning super profits. The market share 
of Telenor (in subscriptions) in the Norwegian end user market was 50 per cent in 2012. The 
combined market share of Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone (in subscriptions) was 61 per 
cent in the German wholesale market and 52 per cent in the German end user market at the 
end of 2012. The rational choices for the consumers in the period of on-net/off-net price 
discrimination, and equal on-net prices offered, were Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone, as 
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they had larger on-net groups than the smaller operators. Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone 
were accused, by E-Plus, of abusing their combined market power. The German Competition 
Authorities agreed that there were facts, like competitive standstill, that implied that further 
investigation of Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone in the case of on-net/off-net end price 
discrimination in 2007 was due. They did, however, not go through with the further 
investigation, as the case became out-dated in 2009 (Bundeskartellamt, 2010). The case was 
out-dated due to the move away from on-net/off-net price discrimination at the time. A pure 
discontinuance of the case against Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone may well be assessed as 
un-fair, as the alternative would have been to punish them in retrospect. 
The concurrent developments from on-net/off-net price discrimination to two-part tariff 
plans without on-net/off-net price discrimination and from high end prices to low end prices 
suggest that the introduction of the new plans were the catalyst for the reduction of the end 
prices. The combined market power of Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone, and the absence of 
regulatory measures taken by the BNA may have been the reason for the late development 
towards lower end prices in Germany. 
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5. Conclusion 
The striking characteristics of the Norwegian and the German mobile telecom sectors 
suggest that the competition in Germany should be stronger than the competition in Norway. 
External factors like the topography, population size, population density and general price 
level, and the internal factors like number of mobile network operators and their relative 
sizes support a German sector characterised by lower costs, stronger competition and lower 
end prices than the Norwegian sector. However, the situation the last five years has been the 
opposite. The German mobile telecom sector has been characterised by higher EBITDA 
margins for the MNOs and higher per-unit end prices, but there has been a rapid 
development toward lower per-unit end prices the last three years. 
Two characteristics of the mobile telecom sectors in the two countries may explain the 
former end price difference between the two national markets. 
The first is the combination of the former on-net/off-net price discrimination and the relative 
market power of the German operators. In Germany, the four MNOs are more evenly 
matched in terms of subscription numbers than the Norwegian MNOs, but the two bigger 
operators, Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone, have still 62 per cent of the wholesale market. 
The two German market leaders are not regulated in the former market 15, and are generally 
not treated as strictly by the German BNA as Telenor by the Norwegian NPT. This is 
natural, but may have had unfavourable effects on the strength of the competition in 
Germany in the period of on-net/off-net price discrimination being the standard tariff model. 
Weak competition due to lack of competitive strength of the two smaller German MNOs was 
the case up to 2007, during the years of subscription standards with on-net/off-net price 
discrimination. Hints of tacit collusion between Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone were also 
given by the German Competition Authorities in their summary of their proceedings against 
Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone in the on-net/off-net price discrimination case. Regardless 
of tacit collusion between the two operators being the case or not, weak competition between 
the two operators and high end-prices characterised the German market up until 2008. 
The Norwegian NPT is consistently treating Telenor stricter than the two other MNOs in the 
Norwegian markets and especially in former market 15 (access and call origination). This is 
due to the exceptional and continuing market power of Telenor in Norway. Even though the 
 56 
 
 
great market power of the market leader primarily is an advantage for Telenor, the resulting 
consistency and regulation of the market 15 give the competitors and potential entrants 
predictable terms of competition. The regulation has been a success, and has provided Tele2 
with the incentives of building the third mobile network (through the asymmetric MTRs), 
has secured the entrance of MVNOs in the wholesale market, and has resulted in relatively 
low end prices in the Norwegian market.  
The other characteristic of the sector that may explain the end price differences is the 
demand sides in Germany and Norway. In Germany, the level of fixed-line voice traffic is 
still higher than the level of mobile voice traffic, with 62 per cent of total voice calls. In 
Norway, the fixed-line share of total voice calls is 27 per cent. The Norwegians are using the 
mobile phone much more than the Germans also in absolute terms. This has been a fact since 
1999, when the difference in mobile use between the two countries started to grow. In 2000, 
the average Norwegian mobile subscriber originated 922 minutes of voice traffic, being 1.78 
times the average German subscriber (OECD, 2001). In 2012, the average Norwegian 
subscriber originated 2214 minutes of voice traffic, being 2.28 times the average German 
(see appendix figure 7.1). The high levels of Norwegian consumption and ARPU ever since 
2000 made the Norwegian market well suited for an introduction of two-part tariff inclusive-
plans. The lower consumption level in German market makes inclusive-plans less desirable 
for the consumers there than in Norway, and a following delay of the inclusive-plans 
becoming the standard plans in Germany is a possible reason for the lower relative fall in 
per-unit end prices from 2008 to 2010 in Germany than in Norway.  
The EBITDA margins of the German MNOs show that there has been room for strengthened 
competition in the German sector, and the falling end prices of the last two years illustrate 
this. The increasing speed of the falling German end prices since 2010 suggest that the 
German sector in the years before was just waiting for something to force the end prices and 
margins down from their high levels. The on-net/off-net price discrimination that was baked 
into most mobile plans before 2006 made competition difficult for the smaller operators and 
the change away from that standard was needed. The inertia in the German sector was 
possibly what put the development on hold, but since 2010 the German sector has been 
surprisingly dynamic. 
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When scaling up the OECD high-use basket of 2008 to fit the consumption of the 2010 
medium-use baskets, and using averages of the prices resulting from the two baskets in 2008, 
2010 and 2013, we find the following end price trends for Norway and Germany: 
Figure 11 
 
Based on the consumption of the OECD medium-use baskets of 2010, in euros per month, see section 2.3. 
We see the steeper trend line of the German end prices. The difference between the end price 
levels, which peaked in relative terms in 2010 (with German end prices being about twofold 
the Norwegian), has disappeared in only three years. 
Assuming that the years of competitive standstill between Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone 
is over and that the full potential of the German mobile competition will be released, the 
German end prices will possibly continue downward further below the level of the 
Norwegian end prices, due to the economies of scale in the German sector. However, one of 
the reasons for the low per-unit end prices in Norway is the high level of mobile voice and 
data traffic. The low level of German mobile voice and data traffic relative to the Norwegian 
means that there is room for both lower per-unit end prices and higher ARPU in Germany, if 
the consumers are lured into or decide to adopt the Norwegian consumption level. With the 
German EBITDA margins already being high, and the relatively high level of included use 
in the standard German mobile plans, the German consumers can start using their mobile 
phones as much as the Norwegians without the ARPU level increasing at all. 
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7. Appendix 
7.1 Figure 
 
Source: (OECD, 2011) 
7.2 Table 
BNA auction 2010, numbers in thousand EUR  BNA auction 2010, numbers in thousand EUR 
Technology neutral, 2600 MHz   Technology neutral, 2000 MHz 
Per 10 MHz, 15 years   Per 10 MHz, 15 years 
High price 19100    High price 103000 
Low price 17700    Low price 67100 
Source: (Bundesnetzagentur, 2010d) 
NPT auction 2007, numbers in thousand EUR  NPT auction 2012, numbers in thousand EUR 
Technology neutral, 2500-2700 MHz   Technology neutral, 2000 MHz 
Per 10 MHz, 15 years   Per 10 MHz, 20 years 
High price 1250    High price 1333 
Low price 625    Low price 1333 
       
2007 EUR/NOK 8    2012 EUR/NOK 7.5 
Sources: (NPT, 2012e) (NPT, 2007c) 
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7.3 Calculation 
Outcome of the German 2010 auction for 41 blocks of mobile telecom frequencies 
Vodafone D2 bought 12 blocks for 1423 mill EUR 
Telefónica O2 bought 11 blocks for 1379 mill EUR 
Telekom Deutschland bought 10 blocks for 1300 mill EUR 
E-Plus bought 8 blocks for 284 mill EUR 
TOTAL 41 blocks for 4386 mill EUR 
      Total # of mob. telecom blocks 120 blocks 
   Ratio 120 blocks to 41 blocks 2.93 
    Est. cost 120 blocks  12837 mill EUR 
   Years 15 
    Estimated cost per year 856 mill EUR 
   Operators 4 
    Estimated cost per operator per year 214 mill EUR 
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8. List of abbreviations 
MNO Mobile Network Operator, owns the physical network 
MVNO Mobile Virtual Network Operator, buys capacity in the network from the 
MNO 
NPT Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority 
BNA Bundesnetzagentur (German Federal Network Agency) 
MTR Mobile Termination Rate 
FTR Fixed-line Termination Rate 
TR Termination Rate 
Flat-rate Tariff model with a certain fixed monthly fee and unlimited included use 
Two-part 
tariff 
Tariff model with a certain fixed monthly fee and a certain amount of 
included use 
KPN Koninklijke PTT Nederland, Dutch telecommunications company 
The EC The European Commission 
The 
Commission 
The European Commission 
ESA The EFTA Surveillance Authority 
EFTA The European Free Trade Association 
Market 7 The market for voice call termination on individual mobile networks, defined 
by the European Commission 
Market 15 The market for access and call origination on public mobile telephone 
networks, defined by the European Commission 
  
